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Abstract
We examine the strategic behavior of leaders and followers in sequential duopoly experiments with errors
in communication: followers either perfectly observe the leaders’ actions or else they observe nothing. Con-
sistent with the theory, the leaders in our experiments enjoy a greater first-mover advantage when followers
observe their actions with higher probability, albeit their advantage is weaker than the theory predicts and
is only weakly increasing with the probability that their actions will be observed. Our results also show that
(i) when informed, followers hardly ever underreact to the leaders’ quantities but tend to overreact slightly,
and (ii) when uninformed, followers try to predict leaders’ quantities and react optimally. This suggests that
followers view the symmetric Cournot outcome as “fair,” and when informed, “punish” leaders who try to
exploit their first-mover advantage. In turn, such punishments by overreactions induce leaders to behave
more softly than the theory predicts.
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The idea that first movers (leaders) may gain a strategic advantage by committing to a certain
course of action is one of the most celebrated insights of non-cooperative game theory and is
widely used in such diverse fields as macroeconomics, international trade, and industrial organi-
zation. This idea dates back at least to von Stackelberg (1934) and was popularized by Schelling
(1960) who emphasized that in order to confer a strategic advantage, the leader’s action must
be reliably communicated to second movers (followers). In reality however, it is highly likely
that the actions of leaders will only be imperfectly observed by followers. Using the terminology
of van Damme and Hurkens (1997) one can distinguish at least two types of possible imperfec-
tions. First, there could be errors in the followers’ perceptions about the action that the leader has
taken. That is, followers may receive a noisy signal about the leader’s action and may therefore
erroneously believe that the leader has played some other action than the one that was actually
played. Second, there could be errors in communication: followers may simply fail to observe the
leader’s action altogether. Since in specific applications either type of error is highly likely, it is
clearly important to explore the implications of imperfect observability for the strategic behavior
of leaders and followers and in particular for the value and robustness of commitment.
Given its importance for applied work, so far, surprisingly little research was done on noisy-
leadership games. This research has focused almost exclusively on the errors in perceptions case
under the special assumption that the noise structure has full support (with some probability,
followers may observe any action from the leader’s strategy set). Bagwell (1995) shows that in
this case, the pure strategy equilibrium outcome jumps discretely from the Stackelberg outcome
(the subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential-move game) when there is no noise to the
Cournot outcome (the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game) when there is even the
slightest amount of noise. Van Damme and Hurkens (1997) show that the same model admits
a mixed strategy equilibrium that converges to the subgame perfect equilibrium as the noise
vanishes. Moreover, this equilibrium is selected by a “reasonable” selection criterion. Maggi
(1999) shows that when the leader has private information about his cost, an increase in the ratio
between the noise in the signal and the noise in the leader’s type shifts the equilibrium outcome
smoothly from the Stackelberg to the Cournot outcome. Oechssler and Schlag (2000) analyze
Bagwell’s noisy leader’s game with a wide variety of evolutionary and learning dynamics and
find that almost all of them admit the Cournot equilibrium as a possible outcome, and often select
it uniquely. Only the continuous best-response dynamic selects the Stackelberg outcome as the
unique long-run outcome if the noise is small.
Experimental evidence by Huck and Müller (2000) and Müller (2001) in the context of a
2 × 2 game with a full-support noise structure reveals that followers seem to ignore small levels
of noise and play a best-response against the observed leader’s action even though with some
probability this might be the “wrong” action. Leaders quickly learn to exploit this tendency
and play the Stackelberg leader’s quantity.1 By contrast, with high levels of noise the Cournot
equilibrium is unique and indeed play converges to this equilibrium. Morgan and Várdy (2004)
conduct experiments on Várdy’s (2004) model in which followers can perfectly observe the
leaders’ choices at a cost. They find that the value of commitment is almost completely preserved
when the cost of observation is small, but is lost when it is large. The general conclusion from
1 With small noise levels, the game admits beside the Cournot equilibrium also two mixed strategy equilibria, one of
which converges to the Stackelberg equilibrium as noise vanishes. Play seems to converge to this equilibrium.
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the value of commitment though its value is smaller than that predicted by the theory.
In this paper we report the results of a series of experiments intended to study the strategic
behavior of leaders and followers in settings that involve errors in communication. The follow-
ers in our experiments received an all-or-nothing signal about the leader’s choice so they either
perfectly observed the leader’s choice, or else they observed nothing.2 This signal technology is
widely used in the literature (e.g., Laffont and Tirole, 1993, and Rubinstein, 1989). From a mod-
eling point of view, the errors in communication case captures situations in which followers are
fully aware of whether they have observed the leader’s true action or not. By contrast, the case of
errors in perceptions captures situations in which followers are always in doubt as to whether they
have observed the leader’s true action or some other action.3 Unlike the errors in perceptions case
with full-support noise structure, the equilibrium outcome under errors in communication shifts
continuously with the probability that followers will observe the leaders’ actions (i.e., with the
level of noise) from the Cournot outcome to the Stackelberg outcome (Chakravorti and Spiegel,
1993).4 Moreover, as intuition suggests, first-movers enjoy a greater strategic advantage when
their actions are observed with a higher probability. Therefore, our setting has the advantage of
allowing for partial commitment (i.e., commitment is no longer a zero or one variable). From
an experimental point of view, this setting has the additional advantage of providing us with a
continuous measure of the power of commitment and allowing us to rely in all cases (including
Cournot and Stackelberg) on the same verbal instructions (the only change is in the probability
with which the leader’s action is observed). This feature is particularly desirable given that dif-
ferent verbal instructions can knowingly or unconsciously trigger different demand effects and
mental representations.
We ran 15 sessions of 30 rounds each, with 6 leaders and 6 followers in each session who
were randomly matched in pairs at the beginning of every round to play a sequential quantity-
setting duopoly game. We implemented 5 treatments with each treatment being implemented
in 3 different sessions. In the first treatment, NOISE0, followers were always informed about
the leaders’ quantities. In treatments NOISE25, NOISE50, and NOISE75, respectively, followers
were informed about the leaders’ quantities with probability 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75, implying that
each follower was informed in some rounds but not in others. And, in treatment NOISE100
followers were never informed about the leaders’ quantities. An important feature of our design
was that each subject had a strategy set that contained 20 possible quantity choices (that is, we
used a large 20 × 20 payoff matrix). In contrast, Huck and Müller (2000) used a small 2 × 2
payoff matrix; this design might have forced their results to be “extreme” since in a 2 × 2 game
2 Our experiments then differ from those of Morgan and Várdy (2004) mainly in that in their experiments, observability
is endogenous (followers decide whether or not to become informed), while in ours it is exogenous.
3 To illustrate this difference, consider for instance Brander and Spencer’s (1985) strategic trade model in which a
home firm and a foreign firm compete in a third-country by setting quantities. By giving the home firm a subsidy, the
home government shifts the home firm’s best response function outward. If the foreign firm observes this policy, it cuts its
own output in response and this benefits the home firm. In practice however, the foreign firm may sometimes be unaware
of the subsidy that the home firm gets; this possibility corresponds to errors in communication. Alternatively, it might
be that the foreign is always aware of the subsidy but is unsure as to its exact size. This case corresponds to errors in
perceptions. Obviously, in real life either case is possible.
4 In other words, the Cournot and the Stackelberg models could be reinterpreted as the polar cases of a family of
duopoly games that differ only with respect to a single parameter: the probability that the leader’s action would be
observed by followers. We believe that this observation is of independent interest since there is no reason to believe that
specific applications should necessarily correspond to one of the polar cases.
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it allows subjects to modify their actions in “smaller” steps while better separating the various
outcomes from one another.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows:
• Weak monotonicity of output in the level of noise: On average, leaders chose 2.35–2.50
units less in treatments NOISE75 and NOISE100 than in treatments NOISE0, NOISE25, and
NOISE50, but their behavior did not vary significantly within each group of treatments. Like-
wise, on average, uninformed followers chose 0.77–1.01 units more in treatments NOISE50,
NOISE75, and NOISE100 than in treatment NOISE25, but their behavior did not vary sig-
nificantly across the first group of treatments. The behavior of informed followers was not
significantly affected by the level of noise.
The first set of findings shows that we only have weak rather than strict monotonicity as the
theory predicts. That is, what matters for leaders and uninformed followers is only whether there
are “large” or “small” levels of noise. Nonetheless, it seems that the leaders have recognized
that they can enjoy a first-mover advantage when their actions are observed by followers but not
otherwise and that uninformed followers have correctly anticipated the leaders’ behavior and re-
acted accordingly. And, consistent with the theory, informed followers have reacted only to what
they saw irrespective of the ex-ante probability of this event. Fischer et al. (2006) obtain similar
experimental results in the context of a two-party bargaining game in which second movers either
perfectly observe the first movers’ demands (and either accept or reject these demands) or else
observe nothing and need to state their own demands (the payoffs then are determined accord-
ing to the Nash demand game). They find that the demands of first movers (uninformed second
movers) weakly decrease (increase) with the level of noise, while the behavior of informed sec-
ond movers is independent of the level of noise.
While the first set of findings is broadly consistent with the theory, the next set reveals some
important differences:
• Underproduction by leaders: On average, leaders chose quantities below their equilib-
rium quantities in all treatments, although the deviation from the equilibrium quantities was
smaller in treatments with higher levels of noise.
• Overproduction by uninformed followers: On average, uninformed followers chose quan-
tities above their equilibrium quantities in all treatments, although the deviation from the
equilibrium quantities was smaller in treatments with higher levels of noise.
• Overreaction by informed followers: On average, informed followers chose quantities
above their best-response to the leaders’ quantities. Their overreaction was larger the larger
was the gap between a leader’s quantity and the Cournot output.
The leaders’ tendency to underproduce and the informed followers’ tendency to overreact are
similar to experimental results of Huck et al. (2001) in the context of quantity leadership games
under perfect observability. They find that on average, leaders chose quantities that are almost
halfway between the Stackelberg leader’s quantity and the (symmetric) Cournot quantity, while
followers overreacted by about 1 unit to the leaders’ quantities.5 In the present experiments how-
5 Huck et al. (2004) find that the leaders’ tendency to underproduce and the followers’ tendency to overreact diminish
but do not disappear when the payoffs of leaders and followers in the Stackelberg outcome are equalized. Weimann et al.
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choices.
The present experiments also generate a much richer set of observations about the followers’
behavior. Among other things, the results reveal the following:
• Best-response was the modal behavior for followers: The modal behavior of both in-
formed and uninformed followers was to respond optimally to the leaders’ actual quantities.
Quite naturally, informed followers played a best-response more than twice as often as un-
informed followers (56.1 vs. 25% of the cases).
• Over- and under-reactions: When informed followers did not play a best-response, they
almost always overreacted to the leaders’ output. In contrast, uninformed followers under-
reacted in 33.5% and overreacted in 41.5% of the cases.
• Time trends: As sessions progressed, uninformed followers played a best-response more
often while informed followers played a best-response less often and instead overreacted
more often.
• Persistence of followers’ behavior: Followers who overreacted (underreacted) in round
t − 1 also tended to overreact (underreact) in round t , especially if they were uninformed in
round t .
Taken together, these observations suggest that the soft behavior of leaders may have been a
rational response to the aggressive behavior of followers.6 In particular, it seems that follow-
ers viewed the symmetric Cournot output as “fair” and whenever they were informed, they
“punished” leaders who produced more than the Cournot output by overreacting to the lead-
ers’ quantities. Such punishments can be very effective as they entail only a small loss to the
follower but hurt the leader substantially.7 The increasing frequency with which informed fol-
lowers overreacted to the leaders’ output and the persistence in their behavior suggest that as
sessions progressed, informed followers became aware of this fact and/or “acquired a taste” for
“punishing” leaders.
As for uninformed followers, it seems that for the most part, they were trying to estimate the
leaders’ output and play a best-response against it. This hypothesis is consistent with the obser-
vation that uninformed followers played a best-response more frequently as sessions progressed
after gaining experience. This implies in turn that followers were willing to “punish” leaders who
were trying to exploit their first-mover advantage only when they were certain that the leaders
deserved to be punished. When uninformed, followers accommodated the leaders’ behavior even
(2000) ran sequential rent-seeking experiments in which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium features a first-mover
advantage. The results were that leaders not only underproduced, but in fact had a strategic disadvantage vis-à-vis fol-
lowers. Another related study is Kübler and Müller (2002). They consider a sequential differentiated products duopoly
market with price competition. However, unlike with quantity competition, their setting features a second-mover advan-
tage rather than a first-mover advantage.
6 This is similar to Harrison and McCabe (1996) who show that soft proposer behavior in ultimatum experiments seems
to be a best response against actual aggressive behavior by responders.
7 To see why, consider a quantity-setting model with two firms, A and B , producing a homogeneous good. The profits
of the two firms are πA = P(qA + qB)qA − CA(qA) and πB = P(qA + qB)qB − CB(qB), where P(·) is the inverse
demand function, qA and qB are the outputs of firms A and B and CA(·) and CB(·) are their cost functions. Now, fix an
equilibrium outcome (q̂A, q̂B ). A small deviation of firm B from q̂B lowers πA by ∂π
A
∂qB
= P ′(q̂A + q̂B )q̂A , but due to
the envelop theorem, it only has a negligible effect on πB .
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advantage. The persistence of deviations from best response by uninformed followers suggests
however that on average, they made systematic errors in predicting the leaders’ outputs.
Despite the important differences between actual and equilibrium behavior, we believe that by
and large, our results support the main quantitative implications of the theory. In particular, lead-
ers seem to enjoy a greater first-mover advantage when there is less noise, albeit their advantage
is smaller than the theory predicts and is only weakly monotonic in the level of noise.
The effect of imperfect observability on the ability of players to commit was also studied in
the context of strategic delegation both theoretically (e.g., Katz, 1991; Fershtman et al., 1991;
and Fershtman and Kalai, 1997) and experimentally (Schotter et al., 2000, and Fershtman and
Gneezy, 2001). However, in that context, the imperfection is in the observation of the contract
that one player offers to his delegate rather than in the observation of the first-mover’s action as
in our study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental
design. The results of the experiments are presented and discussed in Section 3. Concluding
remarks are in Section 4. Appendix A contains an English translation of the written instructions
that were given to the subjects as well as the payoff matrix that they have used.
2. Experimental design
2.1. A noisy-leader game with errors in communication
Our experiments were based on the following game. Two quantity-setting firms, A and B ,
produce a single homogeneous good at no cost. The profits of the two firms are
πA = (a − (qA + qB))qA, and πB = (a − (qA + qB))qB, (1)
where a > 0 and qA and qB are the quantity choices of the two firms. The strategic interaction
between the two firms evolves in two stages. First, firm A chooses qA. Then, firm B gets a signal
about qA that perfectly reveals qA with probability 1 − ε and reveals nothing with probability ε.
In the latter case, firm B only knows that firm A already chose qA but does not observe qA. Based
on the signal, firm B chooses qB , and the profits of the two firms are realized. The objective of
both firms is to maximize their respective profits.
We now characterize the equilibrium of this game in order to establish a benchmark against
which we can compare our experimental results. In this equilibrium, firm B plays a best-response
against its belief about qA, firm A chooses qA to maximize its expected profit given firm B’s
strategy, and firm B’s belief about qA is consistent with qA. When firm B is informed about qA,
its best-response is BRB(qA) = a−qA2 . When firm B is uninformed about qA, its best-response
is BRB(b) = a−b2 , where b is firm B’s belief about qA. Given BRB(qA) and BRB(b), firm A’s
expected profit is
EπA = (1 − ε)
(
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the equilibrium strategy of firm A is:
q̂A = a
2 + ε . (4)
Given q̂A, an uninformed firm B will choose the quantity
q̂B = BRB(q̂A) = a(1 + ε)
2(2 + ε) , (5)




) = a − qA
2
. (6)
The equilibrium then is fully characterized by Eqs. (4)–(6).8 Note that there is a fundamental
difference between firm B’s strategy when it is informed about qA and when it is not: in the
former case, firm B simply chooses a best-response against the actual value of qA, whatever
it is. In the latter case, firm B does not observe qA and hence chooses a best-response against
the equilibrium value of qA rather than the actual value. Hence, when ε = 0 (firm B is always
informed), the game is exactly like a Stackelberg duopoly model with linear demand and mar-
ginal cost: firm A chooses a2 units which is the monopoly output, while Firm B chooses
a
4 units
which is half of the monopoly output. At the other extreme where ε = 1 (firm B is never in-
formed), the game is identical to a (positional order protocol of a) Cournot duopoly model and
both firms produce a3 units. As ε increases from 0 to 1, firm A’s quantity falls continuously from
the Stackelberg leader’s quantity of a2 to the Cournot quantity of
a
3 , whereas firm B’s quantity
increases continuously from the Stackelberg follower’s quantity of a4 to the Cournot quantity
of a3 .
9 Consequently, firm A enjoys a larger first-mover advantage as ε falls from 1 to 0.
At an intuitive level, when ε = 0, firm A commits itself to an aggressive behavior by choosing
a
6 units more than the Cournot output (
a
2 units instead of
a
3 units). This gives firm A a strategic
advantage vis-à-vis firm B because it induces firm B to cut its quantity by a12 units below the
Cournot level ( a4 units instead of
a
3 units). Firm A’s aggressive behavior means that it does not
play a best response against qB : given that qB = a4 , firm A would have liked to cut qA from a2 to
a−a/4
2 = 3a8 . However, it is precisely because firm A cannot alter its commitment to produce a2
units that it gains a strategic advantage vis-à-vis firm 2. As ε grows from 0, the probability that
firm B will not observe qA increases. Whenever firm B does not observe qA, it acts according
to its belief about qA rather than according to the actual value of qA. Holding firm B’s belief, b,
fixed, firm A finds it optimal to play a best response against b, implying for instance that if firm B
would expect that qA = a2 and would choose qB = a4 , firm A would have actually preferred to
set qA = 3a8 . In equilibrium of course, firm B fully anticipates this and hence, some of firm A’s
8 The game does not admit mixed strategy equilibria. To see why, suppose that the leader plays a mixed strategy.
Clearly, the best-response of an informed follower is unique and is independent of how the leader chooses qA . Since πB
is linear in qA , an uninformed follower cares only about the expected value of qA , where the expectation is generated
using the follower’s belief about the leader’s mixed strategy. Hence, an uninformed follower has a unique best response
against the expected value of qA . Consequently, in equilibrium, both the informed and the uninformed followers play
pure strategies. Finally, taking the best responses of the informed and uniformed followers as given, πA has a unique
maximizer and hence, the leader also plays a pure strategy in equilibrium.
9 In equilibrium, firm B correctly anticipates qA and hence, qB is the same irrespective of whether firm B is informed
or uninformed about qA .
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probability 1 − ε, firm B still observes qA, in which case it is beneficial for firm A to commit to
a large output level.
2.2. Experimental implementation
We implemented 5 treatments of the noisy-leader game using the software tool kit z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 1999). We ran 3 sessions for each of the 5 treatments: one set of the 5 treatments
at Humboldt University in Berlin and two more sets at Friedrich-Schiller University in Jena
(Germany). Each session included 12 different subjects who were graduate and undergraduate
students from various departments and were either randomly recruited from a pool of potential
participants or invited to participate by leaflets distributed around the university campus. Sessions
lasted between 60 and 75 minutes and the average earnings were about 17 Euros.
The 5 treatments differed with respect to the underlying noise level. In treatment NOISE0
(Stackelberg treatment), we set ε = 0, so all followers were informed about the quantity chosen
by the leader with whom they were matched. In treatments NOISE25, NOISE50 and NOISE75,
we set ε at 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75, respectively, so followers were informed in some rounds but not
in others. When a follower was uninformed, the computer screen displayed the message “You
don’t get an information about the quantity produced by firm A.” Finally, in treatment NOISE100
(Cournot treatment), we set ε = 1, so after the leader made a choice, the follower’s screen dis-
played the message “Firm A has decided, please make your decision now!”10 At the end of each
round, subjects were told about qA, qB , whether or not firm B was informed about qA, own
profit in the last round, and own cumulative profit.
Upon arrival in the lab, subjects were assigned a computer screen and received written instruc-
tions in German (an English translation appears in Appendix A). After reading the instructions,
subjects were allowed to ask clarifying questions that were answered in private. In the instruc-
tions, subjects were told that they were to act as a firm and will be randomly matched in each of
30 rounds with another firm and that both firms will choose output levels and will earn profits
that were specified in a payoff matrix. At the beginning of each session, 6 subjects were ran-
domly assigned the role of firm A (a leader) and 6 were assigned the role of firm B (a follower).
Players’ roles were kept fixed during the entire session.
Apart from written instructions, subjects also received a payoff matrix (see Appendix A)
in which the profits were expressed in terms of a fictitious currency called “Taler”. In order
to ensure that the outcomes were sufficiently separated from one another without making the
payoff matrix excessively large, we set a = 60 and asked subjects to choose quantities from the
set {13,14, . . . ,32}.11 With a = 60, the Stackelberg leader’s and follower’s quantities are 30
and 15 units, respectively, the Cournot output is 20 units, and the symmetric collusive output is
15 units.
10 Treatment NOISE100 corresponds to a Cournot game with a Positional Order Protocol (POP), where followers know
that the leaders took actions but not what these actions are. Güth et al. (1998) and Müller (2001) provide experimental
evidence that the POP does not change the behavior of subjects in games with a unique Nash equilibrium (like the
Cournot game in treatment NOISE100). In games with multiple Nash equilibria, however, POP may affect behavior (see
e.g., Cooper et al., 1993; Camerer et al., 2004).
11 In order to use a more “natural” range of numbers, we shifted those numbers 12 positions to the left such that the
possible quantity choices in the payoff matrix were {1,2, . . . ,20}. In addition, we ensured that the best-response of
informed followers was single-valued by subtracting one Taler in several cells in the matrix.
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where the equilibrium profits are the same), followers might feel that leaders have an “undue
advantage” and may therefore overproduce in order to “punish” leaders who try to exploit their
first-mover advantage. To neutralize such fairness considerations as much as possible, we as-
signed to each subject an individual and confidential exchange rate from Talers to real currency
(DM in Berlin and Euro in Jena). We felt that if subjects would not know each other’s exchange
rates, fairness considerations would play a smaller role. The exchange rates were randomly se-
lected from the set {300,320,330,340,350} (e.g., 300 Talers = DM 1 in the Berlin sessions and
300 Talers = 0.5 Euros in the Jena sessions) and subjects got personal messages before the session
started that informed them about their own exchange rates but not about their rivals’ exchange
rates. In the 5 sessions held at Berlin and 5 of the sessions held at Jena (each corresponding to
one of the 5 treatments), subjects were not informed about the range of possible exchange rates;
to ensure that all subjects were aware of this feature, the personal message that each subject re-
ceived included the line “Keep in mind that other participants do not necessarily have the same
exchange rate.” In 5 of the sessions at Jena (one session for each treatment), subjects were in-
formed about the distribution of exchange rates in their session but not the actual exchange rates
of other participants.12,13
3. Results
With 15 sessions (3 for each treatment) of 30 rounds each, and 6 leaders and 6 followers
in each session, we have 15 × 6 × 30 = 2700 leaders’ quantity choices, and 2700 followers’
quantity choices. After an initial review of the data, we decided to exclude subjects 47 and 68
who played as followers in treatments NOISE75 and NOISE0, respectively, from the analysis of
followers’ behavior. Both subjects adopted highly idiosyncratic, self-explanatory strategies that
require no further analysis.14 This left us with 2640 observations on followers’ choices, of which
12 The exact message that each subject got was as follows: “Your exchange rate was randomly drawn from the set
{300,310,320,330,340,350} of possible exchange rates. As a result of the individual random draw for each participant,
there is (including you) 1 participant with exchange rate of 300, 3 participants with exchange rate 310, 3 participants with
exchange rate 320, 2 participants with exchange rate 330, 1 participant with exchange rate 340, and 2 participants with
exchange rate 350.” The distribution of exchange rates was randomly generated once and was then used in all sessions.
13 Prior to the 15 sessions reported here, we ran 2 pilot sessions for treatment NOISE0. The design of these sessions was
exactly as described above, except that in the first pilot, all participants had the same exchange rate from Talers to DM, and
this was commonly known, and in the second pilot, subjects switched roles in every round. In both sessions the estimated
reaction function of followers against qA had a positive rather than a negative slope, implying that followers behaved as
if their strategies were strategic complements to the leaders’ strategies rather than strategic substitutes. We believe that
these results were due to the fact that followers felt that leaders had an undue advantage and therefore “punished” leaders
who tried to exploit their first-mover advantage by overproducing. We therefore decided to use confidential exchange
rates to neutralize these fairness considerations as much as possible and focus on other aspects of noisy leadership.
14 Subject 47 adopted a predatory strategy and chose 32 units in each of the first 4 rounds and 30 units in all other rounds.
In the post-experimental questionnaire he wrote “The decisive thought was that in a competition with two contestants the
aim must be to weaken the rival in the short run and to take him over in the long run in order to then gain a maximal payoff
as a monopolist.” Follower subject 68 (who participated in treatment NOISE0 and hence was informed in all rounds)
employed a “tit-for-tat” strategy and always matched the leader’s quantity. In the post-experimental questionnaire he
wrote: “I was not concerned with payoff maximization, but with a just balance regarding payoffs. Therefore, in all of the
30 rounds I have produced the same number of units as firm A despite the risk of earning 0. My goal as a B-firm was
to ‘educate’ the A-firm. That is, the optimal outcome for me would have been the combination 15:15.” Obviously, the
strategies of both subjects are self-explanatory and are at odds with the theory. Including these subjects in the analysis
of the followers’ behavior would only bias the results and make it harder to infer what guided the other followers whose
behavior is not immediately clear.
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1283 were made by informed followers who saw qA before choosing their own quantities, and
1357 were made by uninformed followers who were only told that the leader had already chosen
qA but not what qA was.
In Table 1, we report for each treatment the means and standard deviations of the leaders’
quantities, qA, the uninformed followers’ quantities, qB,uninfo, as well as the equilibrium quan-
tities of leaders, q̂A, and uninformed followers, q̂B,uninfo. For informed followers we report the
mean and standard deviation of infoi,t ≡ qB,infoi,t − BRB(qAi,t ) which is the gap between the actual
quantity of informed follower i in round t , and the follower’s best-response to qA in that round.
According to the theory, we should have infoi,t = 0 for all i and all t . Note that in treatment
NOISE0, all followers were informed, whereas in treatment NOISE100, all followers were un-
informed. For obvious reasons, we have in treatment NOISE25 more observations on informed
followers than in treatments NOISE50 and NOISE75 (400 vs. 261 and 112, respectively) but
fewer observations on uninformed followers (140 vs. 279 and 398, respectively).
Table 1 shows that on average, informed followers chose quantities that exceeded their best-
responses by 0.6–2.1 units. In addition, leaders chose on average smaller quantities, while un-
informed followers chose larger quantities than the theory predicts. By and large however, and
consistent with the theory, the average quantity of leaders (uninformed followers) is decreasing
(increasing) with the level of noise.
In what follows we use regression analysis to study the behavior of leaders and followers
in more detail and uncover some of the factors that were affecting their behavior. Since the
same subjects were matched in each session for 30 rounds, the error terms in our regressions
may be interdependent within each session. To deal with this potentially non-spherical error
structure, we estimated the following regressions using the cluster option provided by ‘STATA.’
This option does not affect the estimated coefficients but estimates the standard errors using
robust variance matrix calculations that relax the assumption of independence of errors within
each session (cluster).15
15 Let G1, . . . ,GM be the M clusters specified in the cluster option. Then, the formula for robust variance calculation
used by the cluster option is Vcluster = (N−1)M(N−k)(M−1) (X′X)−1(
∑M
i=1 u′iui )(X′X)−1, where N is the number of obser-
vations, k is the number of independent variables in the regression, X is the k × M matrix of independent variables,
and ui =
∑
j∈G ej xj , where ej is the residual for observation j in cluster G, and xj is a row vector of independent
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To assess leaders’ behavior, we estimate the following OLS regression:
qAj,t = α0 + α1D25 + α2D50 + α3D75 + α4D100 + αERDER










j + η, (7)
where qAj,t is leader j ’s quantity in round t , Λ is the set of index numbers of all subjects who
played as leaders (firm A), and η is an error term. The independent variables in the regression
are defined as follows:
• D25,D50,D75, and D100 are treatment dummies equal to 1 if leader j participated in treat-
ment NOISE25, NOISE50, NOISE75, or NOISE100, respectively, and equal to 0 otherwise.
Thus, treatment NOISE0 (the Stackelberg treatment) serves as the reference group, and the
treatment dummies measure the effect of noise relative to this benchmark.
• DER is a dummy variable equal to 1 if leader j participated in one of the 5 sessions in which
the subjects were informed about the distribution of exchange rates in their session (in the
remaining 10 sessions, subjects knew only their own exchange rate but not the range of
possible exchange rates of other subjects in their session). We include this dummy variable
to examine whether this design feature affected the leaders’ behavior.
• j,t ≡ qBj,t − BRB(qAj,t ) is the gap between the actual quantity of the follower with whom
leader j was matched in round t and the best-response to leader j ’s quantity in the same
round. The variable −j,t−1 is the 1-period lagged value of j,t , conditional on it being
negative, and +,infoj,t−1 (
+,uninfo
j,t−1 ) is the 1-period lagged value of j,t conditional on it be-
ing positive and conditional on the follower being informed (uninformed). In other words,
−j,t−1 includes underreactions by followers in the previous round (cases in which followers
chose quantities below their best-response), while +,infoj,t−1 and 
+,uninfo
j,t−1 , respectively, in-
clude overreactions by informed and uninformed followers in the previous round. We include
these variables to examine whether leaders modified their behavior in a given round based
on their experience in the previous round. We distinguish between +,infoj,t−1 and 
+,uninfo
j,t−1
because leaders are likely to interpret +,infoj,t−1 as deliberate attempts by informed followers
to “punish” them while interpreting +,uninfoj,t−1 as reflecting the uninformed followers’ diffi-
culty to predict the leaders’ choices. We do not make a similar distinction for underreaction
because almost all underreactions came from uninformed followers.
• T 2t and T 3t , respectively, are dummies equal to 1 if round t is in the 2nd third of a session
(rounds 11–20) or the 3rd third (rounds 21–30), and equal to 0 otherwise. Therefore, rounds
1–10 serve as the reference group, with T 2t and T
3
t capturing possible time trends in leaders’
behavior.
• DAj where j ∈ Λ, are leader-specific dummies that control for idiosyncratic behavior of
leaders. We restrict the sum of the coefficients of these dummies to zero for each treatment.16
variables for observation j , including the intercept. For more details, see STATA Corp. (1999, vol. 3, pp. 156–158 and
178–179), White (1980), and Rogers (1993).
16 This restriction was first proposed by Suits (1984). For a very useful discussion on the use of this approach in
experimental economics, see Königstein (2000).
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ensuring that the estimated coefficient α0 represents the average quantity chosen by leaders,
while the estimated coefficient of each dummy, τj , measures the gap between leader j ’s
quantity and the average quantity selected by all leaders.
The results of leaders’ regressions, L1–L4, are shown in Table 2. We do not report the coef-
ficients of the leader-specific dummies since we are only interested in general tendencies rather
than in the individual behavior of specific subjects. We note however that most of the leader-
specific dummies were significant. Since regression L4 includes lagged variables (−j,t−1 and
+j,t−1), we lose 15 × 6 = 90 observations on the leaders’ behavior in round 1 of each treat-
ment.
Regression L2 shows that informing leaders about the distribution of exchange rates in their
session did not have a significant effect on their behavior. Since the coefficients γ1 and γ2 are
insignificant, it appears from regressions L3 and L4 that the leaders’ behavior was stable over
the course of the sessions. Regressions L3 and L4 suggest that whenever followers were soft
and underreacted, leaders tended to “reciprocate” by lowering qA in the immediately following
round by an average of 0.281 units for each unit of underreaction (since −j,t−1 is negative by
Table 2
Results of the leaders’ regressions (Robust standard errors in parentheses)
Regression
L1 L2 L3 L4
α0
22.737*** 22.832*** 22.845*** 22.909***
(0.568) (0.439) (0.471) (0.535)
α1 (D25)
−0.013 −0.013 −0.013 −0.038
(0.693) (0.500) (0.692) (0.760)
α2 (D50)
−0.187 −0.187 −0.187 −0.134
(0.611) (0.578) (0.611) (0.621)
α3 (D75)
−2.357*** −2.357*** −2.357*** −2.345***
(0.577) (0.471) (0.577) (0.621)
α4 (D100)
−2.507*** −2.507*** −2.507*** −2.275***





























R2 0.370 0.377 0.371 0.413
No. of obs. 2700 2700 2700 2610
Note. Parameter estimates for subject dummies not shown.
* ** ***p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01.
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p-values of (two tailed) pairwise cross-treatment differences in the means of qA
NOISE0 NOISE25 NOISE50 NOISE75
NOISE25 0.961 – – –
NOISE50 0.842 0.847 – –
NOISE75 0.002 0.000 0.000 –
NOISE100 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.856
definition, δ1 > 0 implies a reduction in qA).17 On the other hand, if followers were aggressive
and overreacted, leaders tended to become aggressive as well and raised qA in the immediately
following round by an average of 0.08 units for each unit of overreaction. Overall, the estimated
values of δ1, δ2, and δ3 suggest that leaders tended to play soft after being “nicely” treated and
aggressive after being “mistreated.”18
Turning to the main issue which is the effect of noise on leaders’ behavior, we present in
Table 3 the p-values associated with Wald tests for equalities between pairs of the treatment
dummy coefficients in regression L4 (since treatment NOISE0 serves as the reference group, the
coefficient of this treatment is identically equal to 0).
Table 3 reveals that there is a highly significant difference between the leaders’ behavior
in treatments with large noise levels (NOISE75 and NOISE100) and treatments with relatively
small noise levels (treatments NOISE0, NOISE25, and NOISE50), but no significant difference
between the leaders’ behavior within each of the two groups of treatments. In particular, the
estimated treatment dummy coefficients reported above indicate that qA is more than 2 units
larger when there are small noise levels than when there are large noise levels. These results
imply that qA falls when there is more noise, as the theory predicts, though this occurs in steps
rather than smoothly.
Observation 1. The behavior of leaders had the following features:
(i) On average, leaders underproduced relative to their equilibrium quantities in all treatments,
although the deviation from the equilibrium quantities is smaller in treatments with higher
levels of noise.
(ii) Leaders tended to lower their output following underreactions by followers and raise it
following overreactions by followers.
(iii) Leaders chose significantly smaller quantities in treatments NOISE75 and NOISE100 than
in treatments NOISE0, NOISE25, and NOISE50, but there were no significant across-
treatment differences within each of the two groups of treatments.
3.2. Informed followers’ behavior
We now turn to the behavior of informed followers’ and estimate their reaction function using
the following OLS regression:
17 It is important to bear in mind, however, that since leaders and followers were randomly matched in each round, there
was only a 1/6 chance that a leader would meet the same follower again in the next round.
18 Underreactions can be interpreted as a “nice” behavior because they benefit the leader at a personal cost to the follower
who produces less than the payoff maximizing output. An overreaction can be interpreted as “mean” or “unkind” behavior
because the follower sacrifices a monetary payoff by overproducing in order to hurt the leader.
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i,t = α0 + βqAi,t + αERDER + βERDER × qAi,t












i,t + η, (8)
where qB,infoi,t is follower i’s quantity in round t provided the follower was informed in that round;
qAi,t is the quantity of the leader with whom follower i was matched in round t ; DER, T
2
t , and
T 3t are as in the leaders’ regressions; D
B
i are follower-specific dummies, INF is the set of index
numbers of all subjects who played as followers (firm B) and were informed at least in some
rounds19; and η is an error term. The follower-specific dummies affect both the intercept and
slope of the best-response function and are intended to control for the idiosyncratic behavior of
individual followers. As in the leaders’ case, we restrict the sum of the τi ’s and the sum of the θi ’s
to 0 for each treatment in order to ensure that the estimated coefficients α0 and β will represent
the intercept and slope of the “average” response of informed followers, while the coefficients τj
and θj will measure the deviation of follower j ’s behavior from this average. We do not include
treatment dummies in the regression since according to the theory, informed followers should
play a best-response against qA irrespective of the likelihood of observing it. In Section 3.4 we
will show evidence that indeed there were no across-treatments differences in the behavior of
informed followers.
As in the leaders’ case, we used the cluster option provided by ‘STATA’ to deal with potential
independence of the error terms within each session (cluster). The regression results are presented
in Table 4. Again, we do not report the coefficients of the follower-specific dummies but note that
most of them were significant.
The table shows that, relative to the equilibrium best-response function, the estimated reaction
function of informed followers has a lower intercept (22.66–22.83 compared with 30) and its
slope is much flatter (−0.1 compared with −0.5). Regressions INF2 and INF3 show that the
response function of informed followers did not change significantly when the followers were
informed about the distribution of exchange rates in their session and remained stable over the
course of the sessions (the coefficients αER, βER, γ1, and γ2 are all highly insignificant).
Observation 2. The estimated reaction function of informed followers had a smaller intercept
and was flatter than the equilibrium best-response function and remained stable over time.
3.3. Uninformed followers’ behavior
To assess the behavior of uninformed followers, we estimate the following OLS regression:
q
B,uninfo
i,t = α0 + α1D50 + α2D75 + α3D100 + αERDER + βqAi,t−1












i,t−1 + η, (9)
where qAi,t−1 is the quantity of the leader with whom follower i (who is uninformed in round t)
was matched in round t − 1, and UNF is the set of index numbers of all subjects who played
as followers (firm B) and were uninformed at least in some rounds. We include qAi,t−1 in the
regression to examine how uninformed followers adjusted their behavior on the basis of their
19 Recall however that subjects 47 and 68 were omitted from the data.
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R2 0.571 0.573 0.572
No. of obs. 1283 1283 1283
Note. Parameter estimates for subject dummies not shown.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
most recent observation on qA (recall that after each round subjects saw a screen that summa-
rized what happened in that round, so even uninformed follower knew their leader’s choice at the
end of the round). The other variables are defined as in the leaders’ and the informed followers’
regressions. The treatment dummies D50,D75, and D100 measure the effect of noise on the be-
havior of uninformed followers relative to treatment NOISE25 which serves as a reference group
(recall that in treatment NOISE0 there were no uninformed followers). The regressions’ results
are presented in Table 5.
Regressions UNINF2–UNINF3 show that uninformed followers were not significantly af-
fected by the knowledge about the distribution of exchange rates in their session or by the
behavior of leaders in the previous round, and their behavior remained stable over the course
of the sessions (the coefficients αER, β, γ1, and γ2 are all highly insignificant).
Turning to the effect of noise, Regression UNINF3 shows that uninformed followers chose
0.77–1.01 units less in treatment NOISE25 than in the other 3 treatments in which the level
of noise was higher. Table 6 below shows the p-values associated with Wald tests for equali-
ties between pairs of the treatment dummy coefficients in regression UNINF3 (since treatment
NOISE25 serves as the reference group, the coefficient of this treatment is identically equal to 0).
The table shows that the difference between treatment NOISE25 and the other 3 treatments is
significant. The table also shows however that there are no significant differences in the behavior
of uninformed followers between treatments NOISE50, NOISE75, and NOISE100. Thus, we can
conclude that while more noise induces uninformed followers to raise their quantities as the
theory predicts, the effect occurs, as in the leaders’ case, in steps.
Observation 3. Uninformed followers chose significantly larger quantities in treatments
NOISE50, NOISE75, and NOISE100, than in treatment NOISE25, but there was no significant
cross-treatment differences in their behavior within the former group of treatments.
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R2 0.512 0.587 0.587
No. of obs. 1357 1310 1310
Note. Parameter estimates for subject dummies not shown.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 6
p-values of (two tailed) pairwise cross-treatment differences in the means of qB,uninfo
NOISE25 NOISE50 NOISE75
NOISE50 0.007 – –
NOISE75 0.059 0.551 –
NOISE100 0.007 0.347 0.311
3.4. Followers’ over- and under-reactions
In this subsection we study the followers’ behavior in greater detail by looking at i,t which is
the gap between the actual quantity of follower i in round t and the follower’s best-response to qA
in the same round. We begin by looking at the distribution of i,t for informed and uninformed
followers across all treatments.
Figure 1 shows that the modes of both distributions are equal to 0: whether informed or unin-
formed, the modal behavior of followers was to play a best-response against qA. Not surprisingly
however, the mode for informed followers is more than twice as large as the mode for uninformed
followers, with informed followers playing a best-response in 56.1% of the cases, compared with
only 25% for uninformed followers. The figure also shows that the two distributions are very
similar for  > 0, implying that informed and uninformed followers tended to overreact to qA at
about the same frequency (37.8% for informed followers and 41.5% for uninformed followers).
The main difference between the two distributions is that while informed followers almost never
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underreacted to qA (only 6.1% of the cases), uninformed followers ended up underreacting to
qA in 33.5% of the cases.20
In Fig. 2 we examine the time trend in i,t . The top panel in Fig. 2 shows that as sessions pro-
gressed, the distribution of i,t for uninformed followers became more concentrated around 0,
with uninformed followers playing a best-response against qA, (i.e., choosing  = 0) in 13.7%
of the cases in rounds 1–10, 26% in rounds 11–20, and 35.3% in rounds 21–30. This suggest that
uninformed followers improved their predictions about qA and “learned” to play best-responses
against these predictions. The lower panel in Fig. 2 shows an opposite trend for informed fol-
lowers: they played a best-response against qA in 60.1% of the cases in rounds 1–10, 54.4%
in rounds 11–20, and 53.9% in rounds 21–30. Instead of playing a best-response, informed fol-
lowers tended to overreact to qA. The frequency of overreactions has increased from 33.3% in
rounds 1–10 to 39.8% in rounds 11–20 and 40.3% in rounds 21–30. Bearing in mind that small
overreactions by followers hurt leaders substantially at a small personal loss to followers (see
footnote 7), the decreasing time trend of i,t suggests that as sessions progressed, informed fol-
lowers “learned” that small overreactions were sufficient to “discipline” leaders and induce them
to play soft.
A final breakdown of the distribution of i,t according to treatments appears in Fig. 3. The
figure shows that the mode of the distribution of i,t for both informed and uninformed followers
is equal to 0 in all treatments. The lower panel reveals that there are virtually no cross-treatment
differences in the behavior of informed followers, suggesting that they responded to what they
observed but not to the ex-ante probability of this event. And, although the top panel shows
several cross-treatment differences in the behavior of uninformed followers, we shall see shortly
that these are not statistically significant.
20 There is a big variance however in the behavior of individual followers. For instance, out of 72 followers who were
informed (followers in all treatments but NOISE100), 16 always played a best-response and another 6 played a best-
response in more than 90% of the cases. On the other hand, 9 followers played a best-response in less than 10% of the
cases.
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Fig. 2. The time trend in the distribution of i,t .
To study the behavior of followers further, we estimated the following OLS regression:
i,t = α0 + α1A,infoi,t + α2Linfoi,t + α3A,uninfoi,t−1 + α4Luninfoi,t−1





i + η, (10)
where  is the set of index numbers of all subjects who played as followers (firm B), DBi are
the follower-specific dummies, and η is an error term. The definitions of the new independent
variables and the reasons for including them are as follows:
• A,infoi,t ≡ qA,infoi,t − q̂Ai is the gap between the actual quantity of the leader with whom in-
formed follower i was matched in round t and the equilibrium quantity of that leader. We
include A,infoi,t in the regression to test the hypothesis that whenever leaders do not fully
exploit their first-mover advantage and choose quantities below their equilibrium quantities,
informed followers reward them by underreacting.
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Fig. 3. The distribution of i,t according to treatments.
• Linfoi,t ≡ qA,infoi,t −20 is the gap between the actual quantity of the leader with whom informed
follower i was matched in round t and the Cournot output, conditional on follower i being
informed about qA,infoi,t . We include L
info
i,t in the regression to test the hypothesis that informed
followers view the symmetric Cournot outcome, which in our design is (20,20), as “fair” (it
gives leaders and followers equal payoffs) and “punish” leaders when qA > 20.
• A,uninfoi,t−1 and Luninfoi,t−1 are the 1-period lagged values of A,uninfoi,t and Luninfoi,t which are de-
fined similarly to A,infoi,t and L
info
i,t , but are conditional on follower i being uninformed about
q
A,info
i,t . We include these variables to examine whether the behavior of uninformed followers
in round t was affected by leaders’ deviations from either their equilibrium or their Cournot
quantity in round t − 1 (note that qA,infoi,t−1 is the most recent observation that uninformed
follower i has on leaders’ behavior).
• infoi,t−1 and uninfoi,t−1 , respectively, are the 1-period lagged values of i,t , conditional on fol-
lower i being either informed or uninformed about qAi,t . These variables are intended to
examine whether the behavior of informed and uninformed followers showed persistence.
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data across treatments and across informed/uninformed followers. Regressions D2 and D3 ex-







i,t−1 , and L
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i,t−1 with their respective breakdowns by treatments.21
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) 0.365 (0.441) 0.337 (0.396)
α13 (25
A,uninfo
i,t−1 ) 0.020 (0.072) 0.002 (0.064)
α14 (50
A,uninfo
i,t−1 ) −0.257*** (0.065) −0.249*** (0.061)
α15 (75
A,uninfo
i,t−1 ) 0.125 (0.176) 0.088 (0.156)
α16 (100
A,uninfo
i,t−1 ) −0.005 (0.053) −0.129** (0.045)
α17 (L25
uninfo
i,t−1 ) 0.115 (0.040) −0.046 (0.043)
α18 (L50
uninfo
i,t−1 ) 0.342*** (0.080) 0.245*** (0.080)
α19 (L75
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i,t−1 ) 0.254*** (0.043)
R2 0.448 0.473 0.492
No of obs. 2552 2552 2552
Note. Parameter estimates for subject dummies not shown.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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as in treatment NOISE100 all followers were uninformed while in treatment
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formed followers did not react to leaders’ deviations from their equilibrium quantities. This
remains the case even when we break down the data by treatments (the coefficients α5–α8 are
all insignificant). Hence, it appears that informed followers did not interpret leaders’ quantities
below the equilibrium quantities as a “nice” behavior and did not feel compelled to “reward” it
by underreacting. On the other hand, the coefficient α2 is significant and equal to 0.43, implying
that for each leader’s quantity above the Cournot quantity of 20 units, informed followers overre-
acted by an average of 0.43 units. This is consistent with the hypothesis that informed followers
viewed the leaders’ first-mover advantage as “unfair” and “punished” leaders who were trying
to exploit it. Regressions D2–D3 show that such overreactions were present in all treatments but
NOISE75.
As for uninformed followers, it appears from regression D3 that in treatment NOISE50 they
tended to underreact to qA by an average of 0.249 units for each unit that qA was below the
equilibrium quantity in the immediately previous round and overreact by an average of 0.245
units for each unit that qA was above the Cournot quantity in the immediate previous round.
In all other treatments, uninformed followers do not seem to react to past deviations of leaders
from either their equilibrium or Cournot quantities (an exception is the coefficient α16 which is
negative and significant in D3).
Regression D3 also shows that the behavior of informed, and especially uninformed, followers
was persistent as both ρ1 and ρ2 are significant and positive: other things being equal, followers
who overreacted in round t − 1 also tended to overreact in round t . This tendency was more
than twice as large when followers were uninformed than when they were informed. As dis-
cussed above, the persistence of informed followers could be due to inertia or might indicate that
they “acquired a taste” for “punishing” leaders. For uninformed followers, the persistence could
indicate systematic errors in predicting qA.22
Observation 4. The followers’ tendency to over- and under-react can be summarized as follows:
(i) Irrespective of whether followers were informed or uninformed, their modal behavior was
to play a best-response against the leaders’ output. Not surprisingly, however, informed
followers played a best-response more than twice as often as uninformed followers (56.1%
of the cases vs. 25% for uninformed followers).
(ii) As sessions progressed, uninformed followers played a best-response against the leaders’
outputs more often, whereas informed followers played a best-response less often (though
the latter effect is small).
(iii) Informed followers almost never underreacted. Their tendency to overreact was stronger the
larger was the gap between the leader’s quantity and the Cournot quantity of 20 units but
was not affected by leader’s deviations from their equilibrium quantities.
(iv) With the exception of Treatment NOISE50, uninformed followers did not react to past de-
viations of leaders from either their Cournot or their equilibrium quantities.
NOISE0 all followers were informed. We also do not include the variable L100uninfo
i,t−1 in regressions D2 and D3 since in
treatment NOISE100, q̂A
i
= 20, implying that 100A,uninfo
i,t−1 = L100uninfoi,t−1 .




by including the “third” dummies, T 2t and T
3
t ,
in the regression. However, the coefficients of these dummies were highly insignificant.
58 W. Güth et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 57 (2006) 37–62(v) Followers’ behavior showed persistence as followers who overreacted (underreacted) in
round t − 1 also tended to overreact (underreact) in round t . The level of persistence was
more than two times larger for uninformed followers than for informed followers.
3.5. Why were leaders soft?
Having examined the followers’ behavior in detail, we now return to the leaders’ behavior and
briefly discuss possible reasons for why they underproduced relative to their equilibrium quanti-
ties.
The first reason might be that leaders—despite the random-matching scheme—were trying
to induce collusive outcomes by choosing low quantities and thereby invite followers to behave
similarly. But since only informed followers are aware of the fact that the leader has played soft,
we should expect leaders to be more inclined to play soft in treatments with less noise. Yet, the
leaders’ choices do not show this pattern. Therefore it appears that the soft behavior of leaders
was not motivated by collusion considerations.
Second, it could be that leaders were reluctant to fully exploit their first-mover advantage
because they do not like inequality. But then it is reasonable to expect that this concern for
inequality will greatly diminish if followers do not reciprocate and take advantage of the soft
behavior of leaders. That is, it seems reasonable that leaders would not feel bad about exploiting
their first-mover advantage if they expect followers to exploit their soft behavior. Table 8 shows
for each treatment how followers (including subjects 47 and 68) responded when leaders chose
quantities below the Cournot quantity of 20 units. These quantities can be interpreted as attempts
by leaders to induce outcomes that give both players higher profits than they can get at the
Cournot outcome.
As Table 8 shows, in 141 out of 167 cases (84.4%) in which qA was strictly below 20 units,
informed followers responded with qB > qA and therefore ended up getting larger payoffs than
the leaders. It might be thought that this lack of reciprocity by followers would induce leaders to
exploit their first-mover advantage more often. Yet, as we saw earlier, the coefficients γ1 and γ2
in the leaders’ regressions are insignificant, thereby implying that such pattern did not emerge in
our experiments.
Table 8
Followers’ average response to below-Cournot leader quantities
qA BRB(qA) Mean reactions of informed and uninformed followers
NOISE0 NOISE25 NOISE50 NOISE75 NOISE100
qB,info qB,uninfo qB,info qB,uninfo qB,info qB,uninfo qB,info qB,uninfo
13 24 22.57 – – 19.00 – – – 22.00
14 23 19.20 – 27.00 – – – – 18.50
15 23 21.90 20.00 22.00 19.00 21.43 21.00 23.00 20.09
16 22 20.00 19.00 19.00 21.50 22.00 25.60 21.00 21.38
17 22 22.00 17.25 20.50 20.38 22.00 19.80 24.67 20.86
18 21 20.47 17.71 20.20 16.60 21.00 20.78 21.89 19.66
19 21 20.84 19.50 20.50 21.22 20.83 19.39 20.38 20.26
20 20 20.26 18.77 20.47 20.44 20.62 20.41 21.00 20.71
Cases with 72/82 – 29/42 – 18/20 – 22/23 –
qB > qA when
qA < 20
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rational response to the aggressive behavior of informed followers. According to this hypoth-
esis, leaders were reluctant to fully exploit their first-mover advantage because they wanted to
avoid costly punishments by followers (recall from footnote 7 that the follower’s punishments
are proportional to the leader’s action). This hypothesis is consistent with the observations that
followers overreacted (i.e., chose  > 0) in 40.4% of the cases (1090 out of 2700 cases) and
underreacted (i.e., chose  < 0) in only 19.9% of the cases (536 out of 2700 cases) and that
informed followers tended to overreact more the farther qA was from the Cournot output of 20
units.
4. Conclusion
Sequential decisions in markets are probably the rule rather than the exception. But in practice,
early choices are not always perfectly revealed to rivals. This begs the question of how players
behave in sequential strategic situations with imperfect observability. Studying such strategic
situations empirically is extremely difficult, however, due to obvious limitations of available data
sets. In this paper we study this issue with a controlled experiment under the assumption that
followers either perfectly observe the leaders’ choices or else they observe nothing.
The decision problems of leaders and uninformed followers are rather complex in our experi-
mental design, especially given the fact that we used a large 20 × 20 payoff matrix. Despite that,
by and large, the qualitative results we get are consistent with the theory. In particular, leaders
seem to respond correctly to their ability (or lack thereof) to gain a first-mover advantage, albeit
not to the extent predicted by the theory, while uninformed followers seem to correctly anticipate
the leaders’ behavior and respond accordingly. Therefore, our results seem to support the propo-
sition that errors in communications erode the first-mover advantage of leaders but do it in a way
which is related to the level of noise.
Our experiments also reveal some important differences between the predictions of the the-
ory and the subjects’ behavior. First, punishments by followers are very effective since a small
overreaction to the leaders’ choice entails only a negligible loss to the follower while inflicting
a large loss on the leader which is proportional to the leader’s quantity. Consequently, as lead-
ers choose larger quantities, they become more vulnerable to overreactions by followers. This
property, which has been almost completely neglected in the Industrial Organization literature,
suggests that in sequential games in which strategies are strategic substitutes (like the duopoly
game that we have considered), it is reasonable to expect leaders to play more cautiously than the
theory predicts. This is particularly so in noisy-leadership games in which followers may remain
uninformed about the leaders’ choices and may therefore overreact to the leaders’ choices inad-
vertently.23 Our results suggest that leaders took this possibility into account and shaded their
quantities below their equilibrium quantities in all treatments.
Second, informed followers are willing to sacrifice small amounts of their own payoffs in
order to hurt leaders who try to exploit their first-mover advantage. In particular, their willingness
to “punish” leaders is greater the farther away is the leader’s choice from the symmetric Cournot
outcome.
Third, it seems that followers do not try to “punish” leaders when they are uninformed, even if
on average, they seem to correctly predict that leaders’ quantities exceed the symmetric Cournot
23 Although uninformed followers may end up underreacting (and thereby benefit leaders), risk aversion implies that
leaders should be more concerned with potential overreactions than with underreactions.
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leader’s choices. This suggests that followers punish leaders who try to exploit their first-mover
advantage only when they are certain that the leaders deserve to be punished. When uninformed,
followers accommodate the leaders’ behavior even if they would have punished it had they ob-
served it.24 In other words, it seems that followers punish only “what they see” but do not punish
“what they do not see,” even if on average they correctly anticipate the leaders’ choices. A similar
behavior has been observed in ultimatum experiments in which only proposers know the actual
size of the pie: when the pie turns out to be large, most proposers offer exactly one half of the
small pie and are never punished, even though the large pie is twice as likely implying that with
a high probability the proposer’s offer is in fact “unfair” (see Güth et al., 1996).
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Appendix A
A.1. Translated instructions (from German)
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully! Do not talk to your neighbors and be quiet
during the entire experiment. If you have a question, give notice. We will answer them privately.
In our experiment you can earn different amounts of money, depending on your behavior and that of other participants
who are matched with you.
You act in the role of a firm which produces the same product as another firm in the market. Both firms always have
to make a single decision, namely which quantities they want to produce. In the attached table, you can see the resulting
profits of both firms for all possible quantity combinations.
The table is read as follows: the head of the row represents one firm’s quantity (A-firm) and the head of the column
represents the quantity of the other firm (B-firm). Inside the little box where row and column intersect, the A-firm’s profit
matching this combination of quantities is up to the left and the B-firm’s profit matching these quantities is down to the
right. The profit is denoted in a fictitious unit of money which we call Taler.
How do you make your decision? When the experiment starts, the computer screen will indicate whether you are an
A-firm or a B-firm. You keep this role in the entire experiment. The procedure is that the A-firm always starts.
[The following paragraph only in treatment NOISE0.] This means that the A-firm chooses its quantity first (selects
a line in the table) and the B-firm will be informed about the A-firm’s choice. Knowing the quantity produced by the
A-firm, the B-firm then decides on its quantity (selects a column in the table).
[The following paragraph only in treatments NOISE25, NOISE50 and NOISE75.] This means that the A-firm chooses
its quantity first (selects a line in the table). Then a random move takes place that decides whether the B-firm will or will
not be informed about the decision of the A-firm: With a probability of 25% [50%, 75%] the B-firm will be informed
about the quantity chosen by firm A. With a probability of 75% [50%, 25%] the B-firm will not be informed about the
quantity chosen by firm A. Then the B-firm decides on its quantity (selects a column in the table) either knowing or not
knowing the quantity chosen by firm A before.
24 A case in point is subject 31 who played as a follower in treatment NOISE50 and wrote in the post-experimental
questionnaire: “As a B-firm one can only try to push down A’s profit if one knows its quantity and to try to optimize the
own profit if A’s quantity is not known.”
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a line in the table) and the B-firm will not be informed about the A-firm’s choice. Not knowing the quantity produced by
the A-firm, the B-firm then decides on its quantity (selects a column in the table).
This procedure is repeated over thirty rounds. You do not know the participant with whom you serve the market. In
each round you will be randomly matched with another participant such that always one A-firm and one B-firm will
meet. That is, if you are an A-firm you will always be matched with a B-firm and vice versa.
After each round you will be informed about the quantity of the other firm as well as about your profit in the previous
round and your total payoff so far.
The experiment will be conducted at the computer. This guarantees both anonymity between all participants and
anonymity between you and the experimenter since your decisions can not be assigned to your person.
Your total payoff will be determined by the sum of your own payoffs in each round.
The exchange rate from Taler to DM valid for you will be displayed on the computer screen.
A.2. Payoff matrix
To save space, the payoff matrix presented here shows only the payoffs of the row player. The matrix that was used




Quantity 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
13 442 429 416 403 390 377 364 351 338 325 312 299 286 273 260 247 234 221 208 195
14 462 448 434 420 406 392 378 364 350 336 322 308 294 280 266 252 238 224 209 196
15 480 465 450 435 420 405 390 375 360 345 330 315 300 285 270 255 239 225 210 195
16 496 480 464 448 432 416 400 384 368 352 336 320 304 288 271 256 240 224 208 192
17 510 493 476 459 442 425 408 391 374 357 340 323 305 289 272 255 238 221 204 187
18 522 504 486 468 450 432 414 396 378 360 341 324 306 288 270 252 234 216 198 180
19 532 513 494 475 456 437 418 399 379 361 342 323 304 285 266 247 228 209 190 171
20 540 520 500 480 460 440 419 400 380 360 340 320 300 280 260 240 220 200 180 160
21 546 525 504 483 461 441 420 399 378 357 336 315 294 273 252 231 210 189 168 147
22 550 528 505 484 462 440 418 396 374 352 330 308 286 264 242 220 198 176 154 132
23 551 529 506 483 460 437 414 391 368 345 322 299 276 253 230 207 184 161 138 115
24 552 528 504 480 456 432 408 384 360 336 312 288 264 240 216 192 168 144 120 96
25 550 525 500 475 450 425 400 375 350 325 300 275 250 225 200 175 150 125 100 75
26 546 520 494 468 442 416 390 364 338 312 286 260 234 208 182 156 130 104 78 52
27 540 513 486 459 432 405 378 351 324 297 270 243 216 189 162 135 108 81 54 27
28 532 504 476 448 420 392 364 336 308 280 252 224 196 168 140 112 84 56 28 0
29 522 493 464 435 406 377 348 319 290 261 232 203 174 145 116 87 58 29 0 0
30 510 480 450 420 390 360 330 300 270 240 210 180 150 120 90 60 30 0 0 0
31 496 465 434 403 372 341 310 279 248 217 186 155 124 93 62 31 0 0 0 0
32 480 448 416 384 352 320 288 256 224 192 160 128 96 64 32 0 0 0 0 0
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